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“I COULDN’T SEE IT UNTIL I BELIEVED IT” 
Some Notes on Motivated Reasoning in Constitutional Adjudication 
Mark Tushnet∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is commonplace, though controversial, in the philosophy of sci-
ence to note that all observation is theory-laden.1
This  Comment  suggests  that  Professor  Dan  Kahan’s  provocative 
Foreword
  You can’t see some-
thing until you believe it — that is, until you have some background 
account  —  a  theory  — about  how  to  understand  the  messages  your 
neurons are sending to and in your brain.  If in science with its com-
mitment to intersubjective objectivity, surely even more so in the nor-
matively freighted field of law in a morally pluralistic society. 
2
I think there is a rather deep tension between the form and sub-
stance of Kahan’s argument.  In form it presents itself as an argument 
 might benefit from reflection on the commitment to science 
it exhibits.  Motivated reasoning may be at work in the Foreword as 
well — not reasoning from cultural premises to legal conclusions, but 
reasoning from a background theory of science as a good explanans for 
law in general to conclusions about the structure of legal reasoning as 
displayed  in  Supreme  Court  opinions.  A  related  form  of  reflection 
suggests that Kahan’s route out of the problems he diagnoses might be 
unavailable in practice.  To put it somewhat more sharply than I will 
as I develop the argument, his target audience — the Justices of the 
Supreme Court — might see his proposal for a new style of opinion-
writing as itself motivated by cultural predispositions, packaged as sci-
ence for merely strategic reasons.  One response might be to shift the 
target audience from today’s Justices to tomorrow’s, to those who will 
be selected over the next decades.  Then, though, we would need some 
institutional  and  political  account  of  how  the  selection  processes,  by 
Presidents and Senates, that have produced the Justices we now have, 
might  be  changed  to  produce  the  kind  of  Justice  who  would  find 
Kahan’s prescriptions appealing — and so produce a different kind of 
Justice. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
      ∗  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
  1  The  standard  citation  is  NORWOOD  RUSSELL  HANSON,  PATTERNS  OF  DISCOVERY 
(1958). 
  2  Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011).  
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by a detached observer, noting how different cultural commitments af-
fect the way each Justice assesses the cases the Court decides.  Its sub-
stance  is  the  claim  that  motivated  reasoning  is  pervasive  and  arises 
from  cultural  commitments.  The  question  naturally  presents  itself: 
from what position is Kahan able to stand such that he is a detached 
observer? 
The light cast by the intellectual history of U.S. legal scholarship 
suggests an answer.  Kahan writes in the Progressive branch of the le-
gal realist tradition.  That branch accepted Progressivism’s deep com-
mitment to science and technical expertise to address — and solve — 
society’s problems.3  Kahan’s argument is legal realist in its invocation 
of  social-scientific  knowledge  as  the  basis  for  understanding  what 
courts do in fact, to use Holmes’s phrase.4
In this light Kahan’s is a partisan intervention not different in kind 
from  the  opinions  he  discusses.  Though  I  am  not  nearly  as  deeply 
immersed in the scholarship on cultural cognition as Kahan, it is clear 
to  me  that  the  commitment  to  social-scientific  knowledge  the  Fore-
word exhibits is itself one component of one of the cultural complexes 
that scholarship has identified.
  And, it is Progressive in its 
belief  that  social-scientific  knowledge  will  provide  guidance  for  the 
resolution of normative difficulties, here, normative difficulties associ-
ated with the way in which Justices write opinions.  But, of course, 
Progressivism was more than an intellectual program.  It had political 
commitments as well, to roughly liberal solutions to normative issues 
of public policy. 
5  As Kahan observes, those with a hi-
erarchical  and  individualistic  culture  seem  to  tend  to  be  climate-
change skeptics,6
Seen in that way, Kahan’s Foreword offers just one of many possi-
ble ways of thinking about the Court — within his framework, a so-
cial-scientific way associated with a particular cultural world view.  I 
 and I suspect are skeptical about purportedly scien-
tific claims more generally.  If so, I think it quite unlikely that hierar-
chical individualists would be shaken from their views by Kahan’s so-
cial-scientific  claims.  Again,  to  put  it  a  bit  more  sharply  than  is 
justified, we are quite unlikely to observe anything more than superfi-
cial invocations of science by judicial conservatives.  Put another way, 
the stance of detached scientific observer is one taken by a partisan — 
as indeed Kahan’s analytic framework requires. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  3  The Progressives offered policy proposals that are mostly recognizable today as generally 
liberal (though their enthusiasm for eugenics is not), but, as modern scholarship in law and eco-
nomics suggests, there was no intrinsic political valence to the deep commitments. 
  4  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1897). 
  5  My guess, though it is only that, is that the commitment is a component of the egalitari-
an/communitarian cultural world view. 
  6  Kahan, supra note 2, at 25.  
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note that we need not take his framework as the only one available.  
Again, attention to the history of U.S. legal thought suggests a number 
of possible responses to the social-scientific turn: pure normativity or 
skepticism all the way down, for example. 
II.  CHANGING THE COURT’S STYLE 
I turn now to a more particularized discussion consistent with these 
relatively general observations about Kahan’s enterprise.  Kahan sug-
gests that a different style of opinion writing might alleviate some of 
the difficulties associated with motivated reasoning.  Opinions should 
acknowledge openly that there are competing perspectives that would 
lead to different results, and that those perspectives, while rejected by 
the  majority,  have  the  same  kind  of  integrity  the  majority’s  opinion 
does.7  As an example, Kahan uses the majority’s concession in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller8 that the recognition of an individual right 
to bear arms does not threaten many long-standing regulations of gun 
possession and use.9
As is well-known, the main line of analysis in Heller was thorough-
ly originalist.  Seeking to determine the original public meaning of the 
Second Amendment’s words, Justice Scalia looked at contemporaneous 
discussions of those words and concluded that a reasonable and rea-
sonably well-informed person of the 1790s reading those words would 
conclude  that  they  guaranteed  an  individual  right.  Justice  Stevens 
mined the same sources and concluded that such a person would con-
clude that they guaranteed only a right related to membership in an 
organized  militia.  Strikingly,  both  opinions  are  written  in  a  tone  of 
certainty about what the historical record reveals, and indeed a reader 
could reasonably conclude that Justices Scalia and Stevens each pre-
sented the other as incompetent in reading the sources, or — as Kahan 
would say — as motivated to read the sources as they did because of 
their cultural predispositions. 
  The example is more complex than Kahan indi-
cates. 
Suppose, though, that the sources really are divided.  Having done 
my own review,10
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  7  This suggestion is part of a family of ideas including Professor Robert Burt’s proposal that 
decisions  as  well  as  opinions  award  something  to  both  sides,  ROBERT  A.  BURT,  THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992), and Professor Cass Sunstein’s minimalism in outcome, 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). 
 I think that the evidence is something like a sixty 
  8  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
      9  Id. at 2816–17. 
  10  See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T 
END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007).  
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percent to forty percent preponderance for the individual-right view.11  
Neither opinion in Heller is written in a way that acknowledges this 
possibility.12  Rather, both opinions follow advice attributed to Justice 
Louis Brandeis: “[T]he difficulty with this place is that if you’re only 
fifty-five percent convinced of a proposition, you have to act and vote 
as if you were one hundred percent convinced.”13
So, one part of Heller reinscribes cultural conflict.  Does the sav-
ings paragraph open up a different possibility?  Not necessarily.  Much 
depends on how the Court proposes to defend the wide range of exist-
ing regulations it says it is not questioning.  Kahan might be right if 
the Court were to say that a regulation could be justified by showing 
that the public-safety benefits it provides outweigh the restrictions it 
places on the individual right to keep weapons for self-protection.  Yet, 
the textual evidence in Heller points away from this sort of functional 
inquiry.  Justice Scalia’s opinion indicates, though it does not quite say 
in detail, that the relevant inquiry is going to be whether a particular 
regulation is sufficiently similar to long-standing regulations, especially 
of course those in place when the Second Amendment (or the Four-
teenth Amendment, for state-adopted regulations) was ratified, to fall 
within  a  historically  defined  category  of  regulations  outside  the 
Amendment’s scope.
  This is a prescrip-
tion for the kind of cultural conflict Kahan seeks to transcend, a pre-
scription filled in Heller’s core analysis. 
14
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  11  To the extent that this can be put in original public meaning terms, the thought is something 
like this: if someone had done a survey in 1791 about the Second Amendment’s meaning, sixty 
percent of the respondents would have said that it guaranteed an individual right, forty percent 
that it protected a militia-related right. 
  That inquiry, though, may well yield the same 
“sixty-forty”  results  about  the  evidence  and  the  same  “one  hundred 
percent” results in opinion writing. 
  12  My view is that original-public-meaning theorists have not yet adequately explained what to 
do where the evidence is equivocal in some sense.  Among the candidate solutions are (1) to treat 
the  provisions  at  issue  as  outside  the  scope  of  original-public-meaning  analysis,  so  that  their 
meaning is to be constructed rather than interpreted, to use Professor Keith Whittington’s term; 
(2) to treat the view with more support as “the” original public meaning; or (3) to adopt the inter-
pretation that leaves the widest scope for action by democratically responsible decision-makers 
(the “judicial restraint” approach).  The second solution might work where there are only two 
competing candidate interpretations, but once there are more than two the possibility arises that 
the Court  would enforce,  against legislatures,  a  meaning rejected by a majority  of  those alive 
when the constitutional provision was adopted. 
  13  Cited in Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships 
from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1188 n.235 (2010).  Profes-
sor Snyder  quotes other versions  of Brandeis’s statement, not  all  of  which necessarily refer  to 
opinion writing. 
  14  For similar historically oriented analyses of the Constitution’s coverage, see United States v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–86 (2010), and Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 
S. Ct. 2729, 2734–37 (2011).  
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III.  CHANGING THE JUSTICES 
Justice Brandeis referred to an institutional culture of “this place.” 
Presumably, then, Kahan hopes for a change in that culture.  Yet, it is 
unclear to me how the change is to come about.  On his account, the 
Justices  in  place  already  have  the  cultural  predispositions  that  moti-
vate their reasoning.15
Another possibility is that a Justice might take a small step in offer-
ing a Kahan-like opinion that leaves things open and that, through its 
rhetoric, exhibits a seemingly genuine openness to the possibility that 
the other side might have something to be said for it.  Another Justice 
might  then  reciprocate,  and  the  small  steps  might  accumulate  and 
eventually transform the culture of “this place.”
  Perhaps merely talking to them about the phe-
nomenon will lead them to reflect on and then change their practice.  
But, they will hear Kahan’s advice about opinion writing through the 
filters of their cultural predispositions.  And, as he emphasizes, one ef-
fect of motivated reasoning is suspicion of those who reach different 
conclusions.  So, I would think, the Justices would treat Kahan’s sug-
gestions as themselves motivated by cultural predispositions they — or 
at least some of them — do not share. 
16
One way out of this difficulty is to change the Justices — not to 
change the minds of those already in the position, but to change the 
kind  of  person  who  is  chosen  as  a  Justice.
  Nothing is impossi-
ble,  of  course,  but  I  must  note  my  skepticism  about  the  proposition 
that the Justices currently on the Court will find it worthwhile to en-
gage in this behavior. 
17
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  15  It is barely conceivable that the legal culture generally, and through it the Justices in place, 
would come to accept Kahan’s account of cultural cognition and its effects on the law.  I do not 
fault Kahan for trying to push that kind of change forward, but I think that his own account 
should induce some skepticism about the effort’s likely success. 
  As  those  who  accept 
  16  That the Court consists of only nine people might make modeling and the ensuing emula-
tion more effective than it would be in a larger institution.  I note though that the Justices have 
staffs that, no matter what the formalities of authority within the chambers, might place some 
limits on how far any individual Justice could depart from the culture-in-place. 
  17  I believe that some of the difficulties Kahan describes arise from two related changes in our 
selection processes.  The first, widely noted, is the development of an apparent norm that nomi-
nees for the Supreme Court must have non-trivial amounts of experience as appellate lawyers, 
preferably as judges but if not, certainly as specialists in Supreme Court litigation.  That norm 
seems to have displaced an earlier norm in which significant experience in high-level positions in 
national politics was an alternative qualification.  The usual way of making the point is to com-
pare the pre-Court positions held by the members of the Court that decided Brown v. Board of 
Education with the pre-Court positions held by today’s Justices.  Cf. MARK TUSHNET, WHY 
THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 104 (2010).  The second change is that our national political 
system has changed rather dramatically, from one in which our national political parties were ide-
ologically diverse coalitions held together by a variety of forms of interest-group bargaining into 
one in which the parties are quite ideologically coherent and sharply polarized.  Today, experience 
in high-level national politics might not produce the kind of Justices who would behave in an in-
terestingly different way from the Justices we now have.  
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Kahan’s diagnosis and prescription come to staff the Supreme Court, 
the Court’s institutional culture will change.  Formally, this is well and 
good, but of course it says nothing about how the change in the selec-
tion process will come  about.  Presidents nominate Justices, and the 
Senate confirms or rejects those nominations, for political reasons.  To 
change the selections we would need to change the politics.  I am all in 
favor of doing so, but at present I do not see even glimmerings of the 
kind of transformation we would need.18
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In the end I return to Kahan’s attraction to a science-based analy-
sis of the Supreme Court.  As I have suggested, I hear in his work the 
sounds of an earlier era, the era when Progressives believed that scien-
tific expertise could be called upon to resolve normative questions that 
divided the nation.  Committed to the idea that there was a public in-
terest that transcended  the interests of any group within society, the 
Progressives succeeded for a while, and a revived “progressivism” of 
science and expertise might succeed as well.  But Progressivism col-
lapsed some time in the middle of the last century.  It did so partly for 
political reasons: its successes generated a new kind of pluralist, inter-
est-group politics in which the beneficiaries of Progressive innovations 
used politics to defend their turf.  In one sense Kahan’s analysis of cul-
tural  cognition  attempts  to  retrieve  the  ground  of  science  by  taking 
pluralist politics into account.  But, Progressivism in law collapsed for 
intellectual reasons as well: the Progressive view of science was impe-
rialist  and  utopian.  Technical  specialists  would  replace  political 
decisionmakers across the entire range of public policy, from ratemak-
ing in economic regulation to rehabilitation in the criminal justice sys-
tem and beyond.  The specialists were discredited when they failed to 
pay off on their largest claims.19
 
  I wonder whether Kahan’s position 
might also be vulnerable to the latter objection. 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  18  Perhaps Kahan envisions a gradual change in professional culture, encouraged by the publi-
cation of articles like his and by classroom performances of a particular sort, that would eventual-
ly lead lawyers generally — and through them Presidents and Senators — to think that opinion 
writing in the currently favored style is not acceptable as a matter of professional craft.  Given my 
age, my time-horizon might be too short, but I can only report my reaction: “Not in my lifetime — 
and probably not in his.”  But, as far as I am concerned, go for it. 
  19  For an introduction to my views on these issues, see Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in 
the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565 
(2011). 